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The mechanistic approach of The Theory of Island Biogeography 
and its current relevance 
Viorel Pâslaru 




Philosophers of science have examined The Theory of Island Biogeography by Robert 
MacArthur and E. O. Wilson (1967) mainly due to its important contribution to modeling 
in ecology, but they have not examined it as a representative case of ecological 
explanation. In this paper, I scrutinize the type of explanation used in this paradigmatic 
work of ecology. I describe the philosophy of science of MacArthur and Wilson and 
show that it is mechanistic. Based on this account and in light of contributions to the 
mechanistic conception of explanation due to Craver (2007), and Bechtel and Richardson 
(1993), I argue that MacArthur and Wilson use a mechanistic approach to explain the 
species-area relationship. In light of this examination, I formulate a normative account of 
mechanistic explanation in ecology. Furthermore, I argue that it offers a basis for 
methodological unification of ecology and solves a dispute on the nature of ecology. 
Lastly, I show that proposals for a new paradigm of biogeography appear to maintain the 
norms of mechanistic explanation implicit in The Theory of Island Biogeography. 
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1. Introduction  
 
MacArthur and Wilson’s The Theory of Island Biogeography (1967), TIB hereafter, had 
been viewed as a revolutionary work of ecology just a few years after its publication 
(Cody & Diamond, 1975; Simberloff, 1974), and maintained this title forty years later 
(Lomolino & Brown, 2009; Lomolino, Brown, & Sax, 2010; Lomolino, Riddle, 
Whittaker, & Brown, 2010; May, 2010). TIB is credited with significantly contributing 
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toward introducing quantitative, predictive methods to a field that was mostly descriptive 
and idiographic, consisting of qualitative statements, empirical facts and data that could 
not be generalized (Cody & Diamond, 1975; Lomolino & Brown, 2009; Simberloff, 
1974; Whittaker, 1998). In addition, TIB influenced conservation biology to view 
protected areas as “islands” and introduced new notions to theoretical ecology (Fretwell, 
1975; Kolata, 1974; Lomolino & Brown, 2009; Losos & Ricklefs, 2010; Whittaker, 
1998). The domain of the theory has been expanded to include other island-like 
ecosystems, including lakes, mountaintops, etc., just as MacArthur and Wilson 
anticipated (Lomolino, Brown, et al., 2010, p. 24; MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, pp. 3-4). 
 In his intellectual autobiography, Wilson characterized biogeography as being in a 
state of “grand chaos” and “largely descriptive” when he and MacArthur had focused on 
it in 1961 (1994, p. 244). Its research questions were mostly historical and centered on 
the origin of the fauna and flora of various regions (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 5). 
The largely descriptive biogeography before MacArthur and Wilson identified two 
relationships, yet it did not combine them into a unified conception, rather treated them 
separately. First, the species-area relationship, known since Johann Reinhold Forster 
described it in 1778 and well documented by several biogeographers, is the tendency of 
species’ numbers to increase with island area. Second, the species-isolation relationship, 
also known since its description by Forster, is the tendency of species’ numbers to 
decrease with island isolation (Lomolino & Brown, 2009, p. 15; Lomolino, Riddle, et al., 
2010, p. 517). Wilson’s study of Melanesian ants identified a third characteristic of 
insular biotas: species turnover, i.e., immigrations and extinctions as frequent ecological 
phenomena. The innovation of MacArthur and Wilson was to propose a unifying theory 
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that explains the three characteristics of insular biotas in terms of a dynamic equilibrium 
between immigration and extinction (Lomolino, Brown, et al., 2010, p. 15; Lomolino, 
Riddle, et al., 2010, p. 520). They substituted “one theory for many facts” (MacArthur & 
Wilson, 1967, p. 5). Moreover, they showed that the mathematical expression of the 
equilibrium model (see Figure 1, subsection 4.1) that is the central piece of the theory 
could be used to estimate various parameters, such as the mean dispersal distance of a 
taxon, the degree of saturation of an island whose fauna was displaced from equilibrium, 
and the necessary time to achieve equilibrium. The graphical form of the model (see 
Figure 2, subsection 4.1) allowed them to make predictions about changes in 
immigration, extinction, and turnover rates with area, isolation, severity of climate on 
island, and with the number of species available in the source area that they verified 
against data on insular bird faunas (Lomolino & Brown, 2009, p. 377; MacArthur & 
Wilson, 1963, pp. 374-378). 
 TIB helped create a paradigm that is still influential. Primers of biogeography and 
ecology still use TIB to introduce basic notions of island biogeography (Gotelli, 2008; 
Lomolino, Riddle, et al., 2010) and encyclopedias of ecology and of evolution present the 
ideas of TIB under the rubric of island biogeography (Schoener, 2008; Whittaker, 2002). 
Although the limitations of this paradigm have multiplied, the new proposals to develop 
the theory of island biogeography build on TIB nevertheless (Lomolino, Riddle, et al., 
2010). The book by MacArthur and Wilson remains highly cited, with more than 3,800 
citations just in recent years (2000-2013), from a total of more than 7500 since its 





 This place of TIB in ecology and biogeography warrants the attention of 
philosophers of science.  
 Most philosophical analyses of TIB have examined various epistemic aspects of 
the equilibrium model. In one of the earliest discussions of TIB, Haila and Järvinen 
(1982) view it as a “conceptual framework for the study of insular ecosystems” that has a 
heuristic role in ecological research. They see the value of the equilibrium model of 
species numbers in its contribution to understanding the structure and dynamics of 
populations and communities on islands, rather than in its empirical adequacy. Although 
the equilibrium model is not empirically accurate, it adds to the conceptual tools of 
biologists (Odenbaugh, 2011), and its applicability to various domains is an indication of 
its success (Sismondo, 2000). Kingsland (1995) discusses TIB in the context of history of 
ecology and conceives of the equilibrium model of species as part of a theoretical effort 
to steer ecology away from the “natural history phase” and toward becoming more like 
“physics” focused on repeatable patterns. Continuing this line, Sterelny and Griffiths 
(1999) argue that TIB is an example of ahistorical ecology focused on identifying patterns 
and excluding the “noise” of history. Ishida (2007) disputes the interpretation of Sterelny 
and Griffiths. He argues that mathematical models of TIB explain patterns by identifying 
underlying mechanisms and shows that TIB does not rule out natural history or historical 
explanation in ecology. I am sympathetic to Ishida’s argument, but his focus on 
MacArthur ignores the contribution of Wilson to TIB, and he does not offer an account of 
mechanisms described by the mathematical models, nor does he outline a conception of 
explanation based on descriptions of mechanisms. Schoener (1986) also suggests that the 
                                                        
1
 Data from Web of Science database, webofknowledge.com, as of 9 August 2013. 
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equilibrium model of TIB can be interpreted along mechanistic lines, but does not 
develop this proposal.  
Commentators of TIB have given little attention to the importance of explanation 
in this theory and its relationship to the goal of transforming biogeography into a 
predictive science, yet Wilson affirmed this link when he claimed: “I think biogeography 
can be made into a science. There are striking regularities no one has explained. For 
example, the larger the island, the more the species of birds or ants that live on it” 
(Wilson, 1994, p. 248). Thus, for biogeography to become science, it must explain 
regularities. MacArthur and Wilson ascribed an explanatory role to the equilibrium model 
from the outset. They first formulated the model in an article published before TIB. 
There, they present the model as an alternative explanation of the number of species on 
islands (MacArthur & Wilson, 1963, p. 374). The fact that TIB was instrumental in 
creating a paradigm, and considering it as a project focused on explaining the species-
area relationship, recommends it especially for examining the nature of ecological 
explanation.  
 Against this backdrop, I examine the nature of the explanatory approach that 
MacArthur and Wilson use to articulate TIB and its relevance beyond their project. First, 
I sketch the conception of mechanistic explanation that I assume (section 2). I consider 
then MacArthur and Wilson’s claims on the nature of scientific inquiry (section 3).  In 
section 4, I analyze TIB using the conception of mechanistic explanation and show that 
MacArthur and Wilson’s approach is mechanistic. More specifically, I examine the 
reformulations of the explanandum phenomenon and the various models offered to 
account for it (subsection 4.1). I consider the components of the mechanism responsible 
Mechanistic Approach of The Theory of Island Biogeography 
 
6 
for various levels of species diversity on islands (subsection 4.2), the causal relations 
between them (subsection 4.3), their organization (subsection 4.4), and the experimental 
strategies employed for providing evidence that MacArthur and Wilson use (subsection 
4.5). I end with a general statement on the norms of mechanistic explanation in ecology 
(subsection 5.1); their relevance for resolving a debate on the nature of ecology 
(subsection 5.2); and the use of the norms of mechanistic explanation in some recent 
proposals for a new paradigm of island biogeography (subsection 5.3). 
2. Mechanistic explanation  
Bechtel and Richardson offer this concise characterization of mechanistic explanation:  
By calling the explanations mechanistic, we are highlighting the fact that 
they treat the systems as producing a certain behavior in a manner 
analogous to that of machines developed through human technology. A 
machine is a composite of interrelated parts, each performing its own 
functions, that are combined in such a way that each contributes to 
producing a behavior of the system. A mechanistic explanation identifies 
these parts and their organization, showing how the behavior of the 
machine is a consequence of the parts and their organization. (1993, p. 17) 
The mechanistic perspective on explanation has been subsequently developed by 
Glennan (1996, 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Darden (2006), Bechtel 
(2006; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005) and many others. The field of mechanistic 
explanation is thriving, but for my present analysis, I rely on the work of Bechtel and 
Richardson, who describe mechanistic experimental strategies, and also on the recent 
development of a normative account of mechanistic explanation by Craver (2007). 
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According to Craver (2007, pp. 161-162), a mechanistic explanation needs to satisfy five 
requirements: 
1) Mechanistic explanation must account for the multiple features of the 
explanandum phenomenon, i.e., including precipitating, inhibitory, 
modulating, nonstandard conditions, and byproducts. 
2) Mechanistic explanations are constitutive in the sense that they explain the 
mechanism as a whole in terms of the activities of its parts, which should 
exhibit clusters of properties and could be used for purposes of intervention.  
3) Causation in mechanisms consists of activities of component parts.  
4) Mechanisms are actively, spatially, and temporally organized.  
5) Mechanistic explanation offers an account of constitutive relevance. 
 Formulation of mechanistic explanations proceeds through a series of models that 
vary from how-possibly models, which are “loosely constrained conjectures about the sort 
of mechanism that might suffice to produce the explanandum phenomenon”, to how-
actually models that describe real components, activities, and organizational 
characteristics of the mechanism that produces the phenomenon. Depending on how 
complete the models of mechanisms are, they can vary along the continuum mechanism 
sketch—an incomplete model of a mechanism; mechanism schemata—partial 
descriptions of mechanism; and complete descriptions of mechanisms (Craver, 2007, pp. 
112-114). The regulative ideal of mechanistic explanation is that “constitutive 
explanations must describe all and only the component entities, activities, properties, and 
organizational features that are relevant to the multifaceted phenomenon to be explained” 
(Craver, 2007, p. 111).  
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In section 4, I show how the theory of biogeography of MacArthur and Wilson 
employs this mechanistic approach to explanation. In the next section, I look at 
MacArthur and Wilson’s philosophy of science.  
 
3. MacArthur and Wilson’s philosophy of science    
 
Commentators of TIB typically refer to MacArthur’s writing to understand the 
philosophy of science underlying this major work of ecology. Wilson’s contribution has 
not received the same attention, although his work contains important statements on the 
issue. I examine first the view of MacArthur and then I turn to that of Wilson, insisting in 
both cases on their commitment to a mechanistic approach to doing science.  
 
3.1. MacArthur’s philosophy of science 
 
 One of the ideas that characterizes MacArthur’s view on the nature of scientific 
inquiry, in contrast to his predecessors in biogeography, is that “[t]o do science is to 
search for repeated patterns, not simply to accumulate facts”, and ecology should 
formulate general principles that apply across species (MacArthur, 1972, p. 1) and that 
unify thus a variety of phenomena. MacArthur complements the distinction between the 
search for repeated patterns and accumulation of facts from nature’s complexity with a 
distinction between two explanatory approaches. One could investigate the history of a 
phenomenon, or describe “the machinery of the phenomenon”, or its mechanism, as one 
would call it today. The ecologist and the physicist tend to be machinery oriented, but the 
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paleontologist and most biogeographers tend to be history oriented. The historian often 
pays attention to differences between phenomena, since this may shed light on history. 
By contrast, the “machinery person” is more focused on similarities among phenomena, 
because these reveal regularities (MacArthur, 1972, p. 239). Since investigating “the 
machinery of the phenomenon” reveals what produced it, to explain regularity, one needs 
to describe the mechanism that brings it about. That description of ecological 
mechanisms is explanatory is MacArthur’s second idea on the nature of ecological 
inquiry. Consequently, he urged biogeographers to be more machinery oriented.  
Here are a few examples that illustrate the importance of the notion of machinery, 
aka mechanism in MacArthur’s work. Competition and predation are common and 
regular processes that are also produced by machinery. This is evidenced by the title The 
Machinery of Competition and Predation of the second chapter of his 1972 book. 
MacArthur explains that it is difficult to define competition because “the machinery is 
not obvious”, but some ecologists list “various competitive mechanisms”.  He prefers a 
broad definition of competition such that “[a]ny machinery that can have that effect will 
be called competition. For instance, species A and B can fight, or A can reduce B’s food 
supply, or A can, by its own losses, increase B’s predators” (MacArthur, 1972, p. 21). In 
Geographical Ecology (1972), he examines several cases that “reveal interesting things 
about the mechanisms involved” (p. 78) and mentions that there is a population-
regulating mechanism that prevents a population from consuming entirely its food supply 
(p. 119). Additionally, MacArthur offers examples of mechanistic explanation of various 
phenomena. For example, he uses the work of C. Smith that explains the distribution of 
two squirrel species by referring to their anatomy, food preferences and availability in 
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geographic areas, as well as other properties (MacArthur, 1972, pp. 140-141). MacArthur 
explains the low diversity of tree species in Europe compared to that in North America by 
referring to the advancing glaciers that are “the actual machinery” that pushed species to 
the south. The north-south orientation of mountains in America allowed trees to retreat to 
the south, while the west-east orientation of the Alps and of the Mediterranean did not 
allow trees to escape the pressure of glaciers. This arrangement of the mountains and of 
the sea is an historical accident requiring an historical explanation, while the 
advancement of the glaciers is the mechanism common to both cases (MacArthur, 1972, 
p. 174). 
The third idea of MacArthur’s view on ecology is that ecologists must use the 
hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method. He argued that the method of fitting statistical 
curves of vague biological meaning to the data should be replaced with the more fruitful 
approach of predicting curves based on simple biological hypotheses and to compare 
them with the data (MacArthur, 1957, p. 293). 
 
3.2. Wilson’s philosophy of science 
 
Looking back forty years after its publication, Wilson recalls the founding 
questions that he and MacArthur asked (2009, p. 5): 
How could our seemingly old-fashioned subjects (i.e., ecology and 
evolutionary biology – V.P.) achieve new intellectual rigor and originality 
compared to molecular biology? What can we learn from molecular 
biology on how to advance our own science? We agreed that the basic 
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problem was that ecology and evolutionary biology were mostly unrooted. 
They needed foundations from which explanations can be developed 
bottom-up. Theory has to work from lower to higher levels of biological 
organization. Either alone will not do. Population biology was the 
discipline we thought could serve as base to reinvigorate the theory of 
ecology and evolutionary biology. (Such was the line of reasoning by 
which I later produced the first syntheses of sociobiology, in The Insect 
Societies, in 1971, and Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, in 1975.)  
Wilson’s recollection indicates two foundational ideas of his philosophy of 
science: reductionism and the hypothetico-deductive method, which I examine 
successively. The early advances and success of molecular biology had lead Wilson to 
claim: “I believed deeply in the power of reductionism” (Wilson, 1994, p. 255). Yet he 
did not mean philosophical reductionism, as he called the intertheoretic reductionism 
illustrated by Nagel’s classical account. According to Nagel, a less inclusive theory is 
absorbed into, or deduced from a more comprehensive theory plus theorems derivable 
from it, experimental laws, observation statements and some laws borrowed from other 
special disciplines when instruments are involved (Nagel, 1961, p. 349). Following 
Popper (1974), Wilson thought that philosophical reductionism is wrong. The upper-level 
of organization contains principles that are “new and unexpected” and so cannot be 
derived from the principles of the lower-level science. The laws of the lower-level 
science “are necessary to the discipline above, they challenge and force a mentally more 
efficient restructuring; but they are not sufficient for its purposes” (Wilson, 1977, pp. 
137-138). Instead of conceiving of reduction as deduction of one theory from another, 
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Wilson thought “[r]eduction is a method by which new mechanisms and relational 
processes are discovered” (1978, p. 13). He also characterized reductionism as naturalism 
and that in his sociobiological research meant bringing biology into the social sciences 
(Wilson, 1994, p. 225), but without claiming that biology can explain away the social 
sciences.  
Wilson’s sociobiological research further shows that his belief was not in the 
power of intertheoretic reductionism, but it was about methodological and explanatory 
reductionism. In The Insect Societies, Wilson claims that partial explanations of social 
phenomena consist of descriptions of proximate causes in physiology and behavior, 
combined with the theory of ultimate causes due to colony-level selection. A more nearly 
complete explanation requires in addition the population ecology of colonies (Wilson, 
1971, p. 426). Yet not even the partial explanation fits the classical reductive account. 
Descriptions of physiological and behavioral causes and the theory of group selection do 
not form a more inclusive theory, but separate epistemic approaches. Adding population 
ecology to formulate a nearly complete explanation does not make for intertheoretic 
reduction, since the same problem of separate epistemic approaches persists. Even if 
evolutionary biology were the reducing science, the descriptions of physiological and 
behavioral causes are not borrowed laws from other sciences. Furthermore, intertheoretic 
reductionism requires reducing theories to describe phenomena at a different level than 
those studied by the reduced theory. However, population parameters that would be part 
of the reducing theory are situated on the same stratum that contains the very social 
phenomena whose theory is supposed to be reduced.  
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 Wilson explains that some sociobiological research involves phenomenological 
and fundamental theories. Phenomenological theory consists of equations that predict 
various parameters of social organization, while the fundamental theory derives the 
equations from principles of genetics and ecology (Wilson, 1978, p. 28). Despite the 
relationship between the two types of theories being formulated in terms of derivation, 
this is not evidence of intertheoretic reductionism. Genetics and ecology are different 
disciplines that characterize entities at different levels, but intertheoretic reductionism 
requires the reducing theory to refer to entities at the same level. 
 Wilson’s claims about reductionism could be understood as a commitment to 
methodological and explanatory reductionism in a weaker sense. Higher-level 
phenomena ought to be explained in terms of mechanisms and processes at various lower 
levels, but not at some fundamental level. Sociobiological research by Wilson shows that 
explanation is a multilevel approach, integrating findings from genetics, ecology, studies 
of the environment, animal behavior and physiology, and evolution. This is also the path 
that Wilson followed in conceiving of evolutionary biology (Wilson, 1994, p. 226).  
 Wilson’s research in sociobiology also indicates that unification is a virtue that he 
expected good theories to have. Outlining how sociobiology should develop, he explains 
that a unified science of sociobiology should produce quantitative theory and parameters 
that apply to both termite colonies and troops of rhesus macaques (1971, p. 458). It is an 
expectation that resonates well with MacArthur’s thought that the general principles of 
science should unify phenomena; they should apply to both Paramecium and birds (1972, 
p. 1). 
Mechanistic Approach of The Theory of Island Biogeography 
 
14 
 MacArthur is credited with impressing the hypothetico-deductive method on 
ecologists, yet Wilson’s work contains explicit formulations of the method that, 
according to his recollection, underlies TIB. In both of his aforementioned books on 
sociobiology, Wilson describes the hypothetico-deductive method that he uses.
2
 Here is a 
statement from the Sociobiology: “Above all, good theory is testable. Its results can be 
translated into hypotheses subject to falsifications by appropriate experiments and field 
studies” (Wilson, 2000 [1975], p. 27). TIB affirms this commitment to the hypothetico-
deductive method when it claims: “A theory attempts to identify the factors that 
determine a class of phenomena and to state the permissible relationships among the 
factors as a set of verifiable propositions” (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 5). 
The foregoing analysis shows that Macarthur and Wilson had similar views on the 
nature of scientific inquiry, with the concept of mechanism playing a central role. 
Explanation of biogeographic phenomena consists in description of mechanisms 
producing those phenomena. Descriptions of mechanisms also underlie hypotheses that 
are used to make predictions tested against empirical data. Hypotheses that are not 
rejected support our confidence in the purported mechanism. When the same mechanism 
produces multiple instances, their “unity lies in the pervasiveness of the underlying 
mechanism[s] upon which we depend for explanation” (Salmon, 1984, p. 276) and its 
description would be part of a theory that unifies that variety of cases. In the next section, 
I examine how TIB implements the mechanistic conception of explanation. 
 
4. Mechanistic explanation in The Theory of Island Biogeography 
                                                        
2
 See Wilson (1971, 2-3, 458-460); chapter 17 illustrates application of the method (Ibid., 
328-334); Wilson (2000 [1975], 27-31). 




TIB contains few references to mechanisms. However, based on the normative account of 
mechanistic explanation by Craver (2007) and the work of Bechtel and Richardson 
(1993) on the mechanistic experimental strategies, I show that MacArthur and Wilson 
apply the mechanistic approach to explain the diversity of species on islands, and the 
regular relationship between species’ numbers, i.e., their diversity and the area of island.  
 
4.1. The explanandum phenomenon 
 
MacArthur and Wilson’s first formulation of the explanandum of the theory of 
biogeography is diversity of species on islands, which are understood broadly as any 
isolated area.
3
 The problem is to explain why there is a certain number of species on an 
island and why there are certain species rather than others on the island. The first 




where S is the number of species, A is the area, C is a parameter that varies with the taxon 
and biogeographic region, and z is a constant. Thus, the number of species on an island 
depends on area, C and z. The larger is the area of an island, the greater is the number of 
species on that island.  
MacArthur and Wilson do not see area as a determining factor and explanans of 
the number of species on islands “because area seldom exerts a direct effect on a species’ 
                                                        
3
 That diversity of species is the explanatory focus of MacArthur and Wilson is 
evidenced, for instance, by the claim “Our ultimate theory of species diversity…” 
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 8. Italics added for emphasis - V. P.). 
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presence”, such that the theory of species diversity may not mention area (MacArthur and 
Wilson, 1967, p. 8). Rather, “[m]ore often area allows a large enough sample of habitats, 
which in turn control species occurrence” (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 8). Equation 
(1) is a how-possibly model, sensu Craver. It conjectures the mechanism of species 
diversity in the form of a regular relationship between changes in numbers of species 
given changes in area. The equation approximates the regularity, but is not sufficiently 
explanatory. The regularity itself requires an explanation. Because of this, MacArthur and 
Wilson change the explanandum from diversity of species on islands to orderly 
relationship between island area and species diversity. That the latter is the explanandum 
is evidenced by the very title of the third chapter of their book – Further Explanations of 
the Area-Diversity Pattern (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 19). 
A central piece of the explanans of the orderly relationship between island area 
and species diversity is a model of the underlying mechanism and it comes in two 
versions. The first version of the model (Figure 1) accounts for species diversity as an 
equilibrium between emigration and extinction.  
 




The immigration rate decreases because fewer immigrants belong to new species 
as more species become established. If more species are present on the island, then more 
are going to go extinct. Extinction balances out immigration and so the number of species 
is at equilibrium. This model is a mechanism sketch of the actual mechanism. It describes 
real processes, immigration and extinction, but it does not represent how size of island 
and its distance from the mainland affect the equilibrium number of species. This 
weakness of the immigration-based model prompts MacArthur and Wilson to propose a 
more realistic model, depicted in Figure 2, that takes into account these factors. 





This second model is a mechanism schema, likewise in the sense of Craver. It is a 
more complete description of the mechanism, since it encompasses size of island and its 
distance to mainland in addition to immigration and extinction. Proximity to the source 
region increases the immigration rate, while a decrease in the area of the island increases 
the extinction rate. The various levels of the equilibrium number of species are due to 
various combinations of different sizes of islands and their distances to the source region. 
This model also represents more accurately the explanandum as various equilibria of 
species numbers on islands of various sizes and situated at different distances from the 
mainland. Based on this model, MacArthur and Wilson formulate several models to 
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explore how changes in the modulating conditions, i.e., variations in island size and in 
distance to the source region; presence of stepping stones; and islands forming 
archipelagos affect species diversity on islands (1967, 27-32).  
Table 1 (Figure 3) from the introductory chapter of TIB is another schema, and an 
important one, as I will show, of the mechanism of species diversity on islands.
4
 






                                                        
4
 Values ‘small’ and ‘reduced’ of variables ‘size,’ ‘habitat variety’ and ‘equilibrial 
number of species’ indicate that the table describes only the case of small islands. A table 
for islands of other sizes would not contain new variables, but only different values. For 
example, there would be ‘large’ size, ‘high’ habitat variety and ‘low’ extinction rate.  
5
 For example, Kingsland’s (1995) discussion of TIB focuses only on the first model, 
Figure 1. Ishida (2007) and Odenbaugh (2011) consider only the equation form of the 
equilibrium model (equation 1) and its developments. Sismondo (2000) refers to the first 
two graphical models, Figures 1 and 2, as well as to equation 1.  
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MacArthur and Wilson say about this table that it “shows the sequences of causation as 
we conceive them and their location as topics in the next six chapters of the book” (1967, 
p. 7). This table is not just a plan of the book. The reference to “the sequence of 
causation” suggests that the table is a causal graph in the sense used in the literature on 
causal modeling (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 2000) and on casual 
explanation (Woodward, 2003). Causal graphs consist of nodes linked by directed edges, 
and nodes represent variables. Upper case letters commonly designate nodes. Causal 
relationship between X and Y, in which X causes Y, is represented by the following 
causal graph: X  Y. Instead of upper case letters, the table uses verbal expressions to 
designate causal factors, but the directed edges represent the causal relationships. Given 
how the table is articulated and given MacArthur and Wilson’s explicit admission that the 
table shows the sequence of causation, it follows that the table is a causal graph. And the 
graph represents the causal structure of the mechanism responsible for the orderly 
relationship between various levels of species diversity on islands and their area, and how 
this structure, together with climatic variability, has an effect on evolution.  
The equilibrium model (Figure 2) that has been the main focus of most 
commentators of TIB refers to species numbers, island area, immigration, extinction, and 
distance to the source region as factors determining species’ numbers at equilibrium. The 
equilibrium model captures mathematical dependencies, which cannot be identified with 
causal or explanatory dependency relations. The mathematical dependencies, by 
themselves, are not explanatory. To be explanatory, a causal interpretation must 
complement the model that captures mathematical dependencies (Craver, 2006, p. 365). 
And it is the causal graph depicted in the table that expresses the causal interpretation. It 
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specifies which variables represent causes and which stand for effects. In addition to all 
the variables of the equilibrium model, the causal graph contains habitat variety and 
barriers to dispersal, which comprise stepping-stones, distance to the source region and 
whether islands are clumped. Compared to the equilibrium model, the causal graph 
represents all the factors that MacArthur and Wilson see as responsible for species 
diversity. As such, it is more realistic than the previous ones and is a more complete 
description of components of the mechanism and of relationships between them. 
Additionally, the causal graph indicates that the product of this mechanism, equilibrium 
number of species and turnover rate is causally linked to r selection that together with 
climatic variability and K selection ultimately affect evolution. The upshot is that to 
describe a mechanism, it is necessary to use several models, each of which sheds light on 
some aspect of the mechanism and together they offer a complete description. To 
paraphrase Levins (1966), a complete description of the mechanism is at the intersection 
of several models.  
 
4.2. Constitutive aspect  
 
A good mechanistic explanation identifies real components that satisfy four 
criteria: (1) components have a stable cluster of properties, (2) are robust, (3) can be used 
to intervene onto other parts and activities, and (4) are plausible in a given pragmatic 
context (Craver, 2007, pp. 131-133). The causal graph indicates the components of “the 
machinery” responsible for the species-area relationship. They are islands, source region 
and populations of different species, and they satisfy these criteria. 
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First of all, a caveat on source region: neither the equilibrium models nor the 
causal graph represent it, and MacArthur and Wilson do not examine it in as much detail 
as islands, yet one can infer from the role of the source region in accounting for the 
equilibrium number of species on islands that it is a component. First, immigration to any 
island originates from a source region. Without immigration from a source region, no 
species diversity on any island is possible. Second, whether an island is far or near 
relative to a source region affects immigration. The source region is, hence, a necessary 
component for determining the rate of immigration and the number of species on islands. 
Third, any island that immigration originates from functions as a source region. Since 
islands are components of the “machinery”, the source region is a component as well. 
All three aforementioned components have stable properties, and some of them 
receive extensive attention in TIB. A stable property of islands is area, habitat variety 
being another one. While the equilibrium model does not mention the latter, the causal 
graph shows that changes in size change habitat variety. Traits of species receive ample 
attention. MacArthur and Wilson examine in detail which properties of species are 
relevant for successful colonization and immigration. At the population level, it is birth 
and mortality rates, the intrinsic rate of population growth and efficient utilization of 
resources. They do not leave the investigation of properties of populations at this general 
level that is suitable for modeling. Instead, MacArthur and Wilson list the specific 
attributes of species that make them good colonizers (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, pp. 
80-83). For example, birds that are good colonizers and have high intrinsic population 
growth rates tend to fly in small flocks, while birds that efficiently utilize resources are 
able to occupy many habitats and tend to eat seeds. Plants that have fast individual 
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development, large quantities of progeny and occasionally self-pollinate are good 
colonizers and have high population growth. Some species prefer stable habitats, while 
for others unstable habitats are necessary to flourish. These, as well as other properties of 
organisms differently determine the immigration and extinction rates, and the 
colonization process, under the same conditions. A similar attention to ecological details 
of community structure on islands and to morphological and behavioral properties of 
species helps explain the invasibility of islands (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, pp. 94-
104). This analysis of colonization and immigration in terms of the life history properties 
of species, which are components of these processes, rather than simply measuring and 
modeling these processes, indicates the mechanistic approach.  
The robustness criterion requires that a variety of causally and theoretically 
independent devices should be used to detect parts and to provide evidence for their 
existence (Craver, 2007, p. 132). MacArthur and Wilson used causally and theoretically 
independent sources of evidence to determine that island size indeed influences the level 
at which species equilibrate. In particular, they used evidence from past recordings of 
species diversity on islands of the West Indies, of the Dry Tortugas, and field 
experiments on artificial islands (subsection 4.5 develops this aspect).  
Consistent with the third criterion of real components, MacArthur and Wilson 
modified size, distance and configuration of islands in the equilibrium model to explore 
how such modifications affect the equilibrium number of species (MacArthur & Wilson, 
1967, pp. 27-31). However, such interventions are not restricted to the domain of 
modeling, but are possible and take place on real islands and can be used to intervene 
onto other parts and activities. Environmental and anthropogenic factors routinely 
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change, even if oftentimes at very slow pace, the size and habitat of various islands and 
of source regions. Shortly after the publication of TIB, Wilson and Simberloff 
(Simberloff & Wilson, 1969, 1970; Wilson & Simberloff, 1969) published results of a 
field experiment intended to test the theory. They set the density of faunal populations to 
zero by fumigating several islands (more on this experiment in subsection 4.5). Thus, 
they manipulated density of faunal populations - which are parts - to change equilibrium 
number of species, colonization and extinction rates, which are parts and activities 
respectively.  
The criterion of plausibility requires that “the parts’ existence should be 
demonstrable under the conditions relevant to the given request for explanation of the 
phenomenon” (Craver, 2007, p. 132). Given that “area seldom exerts a direct effect on a 
species’ presence” (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 8), it does not seem to be a plausible 
ecological factor that by itself could have an explanatory role; hence, MacArthur and 
Wilson’s shift from S=CA
z
 to models based on the ecological processes of immigration 
and extinction. Nevertheless, area is plausible as an indicator of an island’s diversity of 
habitats and its ability to accommodate a certain number of species. Because of this, it is 
maintained as a main property of islands.  
MacArthur and Wilson talk about stepping-stones as if they were a separate type 
of component. However, stepping-stones are just islands. Whether these islands function 
as stepping-stones depends on their location between source region and another island, 
and so they do not need to be treated as a separate type of component.   
 
 
Mechanistic Approach of The Theory of Island Biogeography 
 
25 
4.3. Causal relations and activities 
 
“Activities are the causal components in mechanisms”, and they can be used for 
manipulation and control in the sense of Woodward’s (2003) conception of causation 
(Craver, 2007, p. 6). Properly organized productive activities of components are 
responsible, at least partly, for producing the explanandum phenomenon, so a 
mechanistic explanation must describe them. Verbs and verb form (participles, 
gerundives, etc.) offer a guide for identifying activities (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 4). 
Consistent with this view, MacArthur and Wilson’s approach contains numerous 
descriptions of activities of components. For example, considering the recolonization of 
the Krakatau islands after a volcanic eruption destroyed the entire flora and fauna, they 
note about certain birds that they “colonized three islands,” “appeared on the islands,” 
while others have not “established as breeding populations,” or “disappeared.” Yet 
another species was “brooding”
 
(p. 47). The description of a good colonizer contains 
references to a number of activities. For example, birds tend to “fly long distances,” they 
“clump” and “occupy many habitats,” and tend to “eat seeds.” Plants “constantly colonize 
newly opened habitats,” and it is indicated that they self-pollinate, and produce 
propagules, while ants exhibit the trait— of unknown significance—of laying odor trails 
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 81). And all species must somehow traverse the space 
between the source region and the destination island. Most importantly for the 
explanatory role of activities is that the equilibrium models represent the processes of 
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Not all activities are easily visualized like the aforementioned, yet they are 
productive of changes and can be used for manipulation and control in the sense of 
Woodward’s (2003) conception of causation: if there is a possible intervention on X that 
changes the value of Y or the probability distribution of Y, while all other variables are 
held fixed, then X causes Y. Decreasing the distance between island and source region 
reduces immigration and extinction, and increasing the distance declines immigration and 
extinction rates. Changes in immigration and extinction change the equilibrium number 
of species. Similarly, increasing area of an island increases immigration and extinction 
and the equilibrium number of species. The causal graph (Figure 3) indicates causal 
relations of this kind. For example, a small island size reduces habitat diversity, yet the 
size of the island does not manifest any obvious activity, nor does the high extinction rate 
that reduces equilibrial number of species. These productive activities establish 






Organization of components in a mechanism distinguishes them from aggregates, and the 
mechanistic explanation wants to capture that organization (Bechtel and Richardson, 
1993; Craver, 2007). Components form a mechanism provided that they do not make up 
                                                        
6
 Italics added throughout for emphasis – V. P. 
7 For a more detailed argument for linking activities and relationships exploitable for 
manipulation and control based on a different ecological case see Pâslaru (2009). 
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an aggregate, which Craver characterizes based on a definition by Wimsatt (1997): 
assuming that a property or activity A of the whole S is explained by the properties or 
activities P of its parts X1, X2, …, Xm, A property of S is an aggregate of P properties of 
X’s when: 
(W1) InterSubstitution: A is invariant under the rearrangement and 
intersubstitution of Xs; 
(W2) Size Scaling: A remains qualitatively similar (if quantitative, differing only 
in value) with the addition or subtraction of Xs; 
(W3) Decomposition and ReAggregation: A remains invariant under the 
disaggregation and reaggregation of Xs; and  
(W4) Linearity: There are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions between Xs 
that are relevant to A (modified after Craver, 2007, p. 135, and Wimsatt, 1997, p. S376). 
The mechanism of the species-area relationship does not satisfy any of these 
conditions. Plants are early colonizers and herbivores are late colonizers, and species 
migrate to islands from source region, and they cannot be intersubstituted or rearranged, 
contrary to (W1). This is because plants create the conditions for herbivores to get 
established, and source region contains the pool of species, but not vice versa. The 
mechanism does not remain qualitatively similar with the addition or subtraction of parts. 
Subtraction of either the source region, or island, or populations disrupts the functioning 
of the system. Source region is required for species to originate from, and islands are 
necessary for species to migrate to. Hence, condition (W2) for aggregativity is not met. It 
is not possibly to take the mechanism apart and then put it back together, as required by 
(W3), without disrupting their collective ability to produce the orderly relationship 
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between species’ numbers and area. Separating some components, islands or source 
region, destroys the system. The effect of separating populations of species depends on 
whether their role in the island community can be compensated. If the role of a species 
cannot be substituted, its removal disrupts the functioning of the mechanism and 
reaggregation is problematic. As for condition (W4), it is not satisfied because of the 
cooperative and inhibitory interactions between components, especially between 
populations. Seeds need birds to colonize islands, and herbivores need plants to survive. 
Established species predate on or compete with newly arriving species, or with the 
established ones, which leads to extinction or inhibition of population growth.  
The mechanism of species diversity is spatially and temporally organized. Size of 
islands, their location relative to source region, and whether stepping-stones connect 
islands and the source region are important for constituting the mechanism. Islands that 
are too small for species, say, insects, birds, or plants, to populate them and islands that 
are located at a distance that exceeds their ability to reach them will not receive 
immigration; hence, there will be no species diversity on these islands. Stepping-stones 
connecting islands increase immigration rate, but if stepping-stones are numerous and 
organized in a manner that creates a corridor between the island and the source region, 
the species dynamics on that island will be assimilated to that on the mainland. The order 
and rates of immigration and extinction determine the relationship between species’ 
numbers and area. Succession following a major environmental event, say, a volcanic 
eruption that wipes out the flora and fauna, has a specific order. Pioneer plants colonize 
the barren island first. Plants of secondary succession and then trees follow them 
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, p. 50). Trees cannot colonize an island before pioneer 
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plants. If the rate of immigration is too low, species’ numbers on islands will be below 
the expected equilibrium point. A similar outcome would occur if rates of extinction were 
too high, say, because tsunamis often strike the island. 
 
4.5. Constitutive Relevance 
 
Bechtel and Richardson (1993) and, following them, Craver (2007) argue that two types 
of experimental interventions are required to identify the relevant functions and 
components in a system. The analytic, or bottom-up interventions inhibit or stimulate the 
functioning of a component. Alternatively, one could also increase or decrease the 
quantity of that component. If the component intervened upon is important for the 
functioning of the system, the intervention will change the behavior of the system. The 
top-down experiments, or synthetic strategy, make the system perform a function and one 
examines which component parts become active. Additionally, one could create a model 
system based on a hypothesis regarding the components, their operations and 
organization that are required for its functioning and then compare the behavior of the 
model system with that of the real one. If both bottom-up and top-down experimental 
interventions yield convergent results, the component subject to intervention is a relevant 
one for the system to produce the phenomenon under scrutiny.  
To support their explanation of the species-area relationship, MacArthur and 
Wilson use evidence that presupposes both the analytical and synthetic experimental 
strategies. Examining the second equilibrium model (Figure 2), they suggest a number of 
interventions on islands. Increasing the degree of isolation between the island and the 
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source region reduces immigration. Intervening to decrease the area of the island 
increases extinction rate (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, pp. 22-23). They also examine 
four cases of species distribution that vary due to changes in island area, distance 
between islands and source region, and configuration of islands (MacArthur & Wilson, 
1967, pp. 27-32). Each of the models of those cases presupposes the use of inhibitory and 
excitatory techniques of the bottom-up experiments. In what would amount to a thought 
experiment executed by modifying the variables of models, MacArthur and Wilson 
intervene and increase the distance between archipelagos and their source region 
(MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 28, figure 12), or between some islands and the source 
region (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 31, figure 15). These modifications are analogous 
to excitatory interventions, for they increase the entity that separates islands from the 
source region. Size of stepping-stones (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 29, figure 13) and 
distances between islands forming an archipelago (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967, p. 31, 
figure 15) are also manipulated. 
 MacArthur and Wilson use observational data from various replicates, i.e., 
islands, in a manner that illustrates another way of applying the excitatory technique in 
thought experiments. Comparing data on densities of species on several islands of the 
Dry Tortugas of roughly the same area, they found out that an increase in species’ 
numbers on islands of roughly the same area increases the extinction rate (MacArthur and 
Wilson, 1967, pp. 51-55). Using replicates of these islands amounts to an experiment in 
which density of species is increased to various levels to elicit its effect on extinction 
rate, while the area remains unchanged. 
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 MacArthur and Wilson also employ evidence from experiments performed by 
other ecologists. These experiments can be seen as top-down experiments, or as 
applications of the synthetic strategy. In particular, the design of these experiments 
assumes a hypothesis about the process of island colonization, formulates a model of how 
the system that underlies this process functions and then tests the model against the 
behavior of actual systems, just as Bechtel and Richardson (1993) and Craver (2007) 
describe the synthetic strategy. Put differently, the system is set to operate and the 
experimenter examines which components are activated. One such experiment was 
performed by Bassett Maguire, Jr. who simulated islands by using bottles of fresh water 
placed at various distances from a fresh water pond and at various heights above the 
ground. In agreement with the equilibrium model, the colonization curve drops as 
distance from the source region increases. The design of this experiment assumes the 
hypothesis that distance from the source region is a determinant of species’ numbers on 
islands (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, pp. 42-43). Another experiment to which 
MacArthur and Wilson refer is due to Ruth Patrick. She suspended small glass slides of 
two sizes in the water of a spring and then counted and identified the attached diatoms 
after every two weeks. The design of this experiment assumes the hypothesis that islands 
of larger areas accommodate a greater number of species. The data shows indeed that 
“islands” of large area hold more species than small ones, and that the competition that 
begins once the diatoms become crowded reduces the number of species (MacArthur and 
Wilson, 1967, pp. 55-57).  
 MacArthur and Wilson did not perform experiments using the analytic and 
synthetic strategies to test their theory, but Simberloff and Wilson did. To test certain 
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aspects of the theory of island biogeography, they fumigated six small mangrove islands 
in the Florida Keys to defaunate them and then monitored for two years how faunal 
species recolonize the islands. The islands were ultimately recolonized and the faunal 
species reached a dynamic equilibrium as expected in light of the theory of island 
biogeography (Simberloff & Wilson, 1969, 1970; Wilson & Simberloff, 1969). To the 
extent that the experiment decreases to zero the amount of one component – faunal 
species – it implements the analytic inhibitory strategy. In the absence of faunal species, 
no equilibrium of such species can occur, which shows that faunal species are a relevant 
component of the “machinery.” However, the significance of this experiment is better 
assessed if it is seen as implementing the synthetic strategy. Islands are model systems 
aimed to test hypotheses about equilibrium of species, colonization processes, and the 
role of island area and distance from the source region in influencing these processes. 
Considered from this point of view, defaunation initiates colonization and the 
experimenter examines the process of colonization, the number of species at which 
immigration and extinction equilibrate, and the role of island area and distance from the 
source region in affecting these processes. 
 
5. The Message of The Theory of Island Biogeography beyond 1967 
 
Having significantly contributed to the initiation of a paradigm of ecology in general and 
of island biogeography in particular, TIB is a canonical example to identify the norms of 
scientific explanation in ecology and to examine how the focus on mechanisms can help 
solve other debates in ecology. I outline first an account of the norms of ecological 
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explanation based on the analysis from section 4, and then I show how the notion of 
mechanism could resolve a debate from ecology. I also show that even if the equilibrium 
paradigm of TIB were to be changed, the norms of mechanistic explanation in ecology 
will be used to account for ecological phenomena within the next paradigm of insular 
biogeography. 
 
5.1. An account of explanation in ecology 
 
It can be learned from TIB that to explain in ecology is to describe the mechanism of a 
phenomenon under scrutiny and that this description can extend over several levels and 
comprise several models that represent various aspects of the mechanism. The 
explanandum phenomenon has multiple aspects and the mechanistic explanation must 
account for all of them. Ecological phenomena are produced under conditions that 
modulate, precipitate, or perturb their production, or they could occur in non-standard 
conditions. Description of the putative mechanism must show how it produces the 
explanandum phenomenon in all these conditions. Changes in the size of islands, their 
distance to the source region and their organization in archipelagos modulate the area-
diversity relationship. Predation modulates competition, and changes in temperature and 
moisture modulate colonization. A very small size of islands perturbs the area-diversity 
pattern, but so do disease and parasitism that perturb population growth. Cataclysms, 
such as volcanic eruptions, precipitate the formation of the area-diversity pattern, and the 
introduction of lynxes in a hare habitat precipitates the formation of predator-prey 
oscillations. The same mechanism accounts for the area-diversity relationship obtained in 
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experimental conditions, which are not standard, as well as in natural conditions. 
Likewise, the same mechanism of competition accounts for competitive exclusion 
obtained in Gause’s bottles and in natural conditions. Craver (2007, p. 126) thinks that 
knowing the inhibiting conditions is part of a complete characterization of the 
phenomenon. Although MacArthur and Wilson do not examine conditions that inhibit 
production of the phenomenon, the requirement to describe them could also be part of the 
normative account of ecological explanation.  
 Since mechanisms consist of entities and activities organized such that they 
produce the phenomenon under scrutiny (Craver, 2007, p. 6), mechanistic explanations in 
ecology must describe each of these elements. Entities are the parts of the mechanism, 
and they are expected to have stable properties, to be robust, to be ecologically plausible, 
and they could be used to intervene upon other entities and activities. Activities are what 
the entities do in the mechanism. This requires ecologists to describe the relevant 
behaviors of species and of inanimate components. Depending on the explanandum 
phenomenon, the relevant behavior could be feeding, mating, colonization, competitive 
interaction, etc. Activities of inanimate components could be ferrying insects to islands, 
dispersing seeds, providing shelter and habitat, or preventing dispersion, setting the stage 
for succession by wiping out flora and fauna, eliminating predators, or breaking seed 
dormancy. Both components and activities are organized actively, spatially and 
temporally, and mechanistic explanation has to specify that clearly. The dominant type of 
organization varies with the specific mechanism. Some mechanisms of interspecific 
competition for a limited food resource could be spatially organized, with organisms of 
different species feeding on the same food at different heights of a tree. In other cases, 
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temporal organization plays the key role, as it happens with competing organisms that 
feed on the same resource at different times.  
 Mechanistic explanations in ecology are multilevel. They integrate information 
from several levels of reality because mechanisms producing ecological phenomena are 
multilevel. Components of mechanisms could come from various strata of the traditional 
hierarchy of levels that extends from molecules and cells, to organisms, populations, 
communities and all the way up to the biosphere, and include inanimate objects of 
various sizes, or even processes. A mechanism, such as the mechanism responsible for 
the colonization success of invasive species, could consist of entities from different strata 
of the traditional hierarchy: allelochemicals, populations, communities and soil. Since 
any mechanism is a mechanism of a phenomenon (Glennan, 2002), what entities make up 
a mechanism depends on the phenomenon being investigated (Craver, 2007). If the 
problem under scrutiny requires it, every mechanism component can be further examined 
to study its constituents. That is possible because components of the lower levels consist 
of components organized at even lower levels, which means that a mechanism can be 
composed of other lower level mechanisms. Scrutiny of the competitive success of 
invasive species can lead to examining the physiological mechanism producing 
allelochemicals, their molecular composition, and their growth-suppressing effect on 
other species. Similarly for processes, that can be seen as parts of mechanisms. 
Colonization and extinction are processes consisting of numerous and various lower-level 
components. Dispersions by wind, by debris, or by flight are lower-level components of 
colonization. Deaths due to interspecific competition, predation, or parasitism are lower-
level components of extinction. One can further look at, say, dispersion by flight and 
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examine the properties of lower level entities and activities, and their organization. Thus, 
one would examine how the anatomy and physiology of birds, or insects enables them to 
cover the distances between islands, and whether air currents aid them. At what lower 
level should mechanistic explanation stop? This question cannot be answered based on a 
hierarchy of levels that is independent of the explanandum phenomenon, but rather on a 
case-by-case basis and depending on the explanatory relevance of the lower level 
component (Craver, 2007, p. 191). 
 Mechanistic explanations must incorporate descriptions of the causal relationships 
between components of the ecological mechanism. These relationships should be 
understood along manipulationist lines. A component X causes Y provided that changes 
in X bring about changes in Y, while all other paths from X to Y are blocked. Whenever 
possible, the specific activity of components should be specified. X might cause Y in 
virtue of the fact that X is in a symbiotic relationship with Y and facilitates Y’s 
acquisition of nutrients, or X might live as an ectoparasite on Y and deprive it of some of 
its energy. Causal interpretations in terms of activities and relationships that can be 
subject to manipulations should accompany phenomenological accounts of associations 
between species.  
 Good mechanistic explanations are expected to describe all of the relevant 
components and interactions between them, and none of the irrelevant ones (Craver, 
2007, p. 140). Relevant components are at the intersection of analytic and synthetic 
experimental strategies. Experiments in ecology are traditionally categorized into 
laboratory experiments, field experiments, and natural experiments. Each of them has 
strengths and weaknesses, and ecologists combine evidence from all three types of 
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experiments, or only two, usually field and laboratory experiments (Diamond, 1986). The 
requirement of constitutive relevance calls for a combination of these types of 
experiments so as to implement the mutual manipulability of component parts as a way of 
identifying the relevant components. This means that lab or field experiments that are 
designed on the analytic strategy are insufficient for ruling out irrelevant factors. Lab or 
field experiments based on the synthetic strategy must complement the former.  
 The kind of mechanisms that ecology and biogeography should be after according 
to MacArthur and Wilson are complex-systems mechanisms, as Glennan (2002, 2010) 
calls them. Complex-systems mechanisms are multiply realizable. They are reliable 
mechanisms and their repeated functioning produces regularities, which are described by 
generalizations, some of which are thought of as laws. The mechanism of the area-
diversity pattern articulated by MacArthur and Wilson is such a reliable mechanism. Its 
reliable operation produces the species-area regularity that Schoener (1976)
8
 and Lange 
(2005) describe as a law of ecology. An important consequence of the reliability of 
complex-mechanisms is that their behavior is predictable, and, consequently, one can 
formulate predictions of specific values and test hypotheses. By describing complex-
systems mechanisms, ecology and biogeography become predictive sciences. This aspect 
connects the goal of describing mechanisms with the hypothetico-deductive method that 
both MacArthur and Wilson endorsed. If the description of the complex-systems 
mechanism is accurate, hypotheses derived from its model will not be invalidated by 
data. Hypotheses derived from inaccurate descriptions of mechanisms will be falsified.  
                                                        
8
 Apud Lomolino, et al. (2010, p. 513). 
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 Not all ecological phenomena are repeatable. Some of them are singular and of 
interest to ecologists. They are produced by ephemeral-mechanisms, as Glennan (2002, 
2010) describes them. Ephemeral-mechanisms are not multiply-realizable. They are 
contingent, singular sequences of events that lead to a singular occurrence, such as the 
continental drift, the escape of the European gypsy moth caterpillars from Trouvelot’s 
house in 1868 and the onset of the defaunation of hardwood forests in the Northeast of 
United States, and the introduction of Zebra mussel around 1985 to the Great Lakes. The 
norms of mechanistic explanation apply to ephemeral-mechanisms, as well. A good 
description of ephemeral-mechanisms specifies their components, their spatial or 
temporal organization, and the way they interact. Since ephemeral-mechanisms produce 
singular phenomena, whose occurrence is typically independent of ecologists, synthetic 
experimental strategies take precedence over analytical ones in guiding the identification 
of relevant components and of causal relationships between them. To study singular 
phenomena, ecologists have to simulate singular phenomena in laboratory or field 
experiments, which requires use of synthetic strategy. Employment of analytic strategies 
is confined to causal modeling that allows manipulation of values of variables that 
represent components and their spatial or temporal organization.  
 
5.2. A debate on the nature of ecology 
 
 I showed in section 3 that MacArthur and Wilson saw explanation, as opposed to 
naturalists’ detailed descriptions, related to the issue of establishing biogeography, i.e., 
ecology of geographic distributions of species as a science. Ecology becomes science 
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once it explains patterns in nature. MacArthur and Wilson’s use of the mechanistic 
approach to explain the area-diversity pattern implies a conception of science centered on 
describing mechanisms responsible for classes of similar phenomena. This view of 
science and the associated norms of explanation can help resolve a recent debate on the 
nature of ecology and its explanatory tools. The opposition between a conception of 
ecology that is content with documenting the complexities of nature, as MacArthur 
characterized it, and a conception that asks ecologists to explain repeated patterns has 
continued in the form of a tension between views conceiving of ecology as an historical 
science, and those that would like to see it formulate and use laws similarly to physics, 
and those that opt for description of mechanisms.  
 Lev Ginzburg and Mark Colyvan (Mark Colyvan & Ginzburg, 2003a, 2003b; M. 
Colyvan & Ginzburg, 2010; Ginzburg & Colyvan, 2004) argue for a nomothetic research 
program for ecology. They think that exponential growth of populations, usually known 
as Malthus’ law, is the first law of ecology and it is analogous to the first law of Newton 
in describing a default state from which actual populations deviate. And the deviation 
must be accounted for in terms of mechanisms. Marcel Weber (1999) offers a similar 
argument and account of the explanatory role of laws, but he thinks that the principle of 
competitive exclusion is the first law of ecology. Several ecologists (Berryman, 1999, 
2003; Murray, 2000; Turchin, 2001) also argue in favor of laws of ecology, but they do 
not shed light on their explanatory role, but mostly look at the predictive role of laws. 
According to the opposite view, biology, including the discipline of ecology, is an 
historical science and cannot have laws like physics because its systems are far-from 
equilibrium, nonreversible and require historical explanations (Quenette & Gerard, 1993). 
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Ecology should be conceived of as a science of case studies, centered on revealing the 
causal nexus underlying a phenomenon, instead of laws (Shrader-Frechette, 2003; 
Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, 1993). Ecology does not have laws like those of Newton 
that state how the universe works; it has only generalizations about observed regularities 
and that can be used to formulate models that describe the systems under scrutiny 
(O'Hara, 2005). Both its epistemology and its methodology make ecology an historical 
science (Brown, 2011). The other alternative that appears to be embraced by many 
ecologists, as suggested by their work and by formulations of research agendas for 
ecology (Simberloff, 2004; Sutherland, et al., 2013), is to describe mechanisms that 
underlie regularities (Lawton, 1999) and that are responsible for a group of phenomena 
(Tilman, 1987).  
 The idea of mechanism and the norms of mechanistic explanation implicit in TIB 
could solve the dispute between the aforementioned views and provide a basis for 
methodological unification of ecology. In light of the foregoing account of explanation in 
ecology, I suggest that the basis of ecological explanations is mechanistic, but the 
specific mechanisms and phenomena under scrutiny are different, which makes the 
ecological enterprises appear different. When the focus of ecologists is on singular 
phenomena produced by ephemeral ecological mechanisms, they appear as formulating 
historical explanations. When ecologists turn their attention to complex-mechanisms of 
varying degrees of reliability and which, consequently, produce phenomena of various 
degrees of regularity, they are doing what most ecologists do: identifying mechanisms 
responsible for various groups of phenomena. However, when ecologists look for 
regularities across various domains of less restricted scope, they embark on a research 
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program that appears nomothetic. However, even if such regularities are identified, their 
use in explanations cannot dispense of mechanism descriptions, as the work of Ginzburg 
and Colyvan, and Weber shows. Malthus’ law and the principle of competitive exclusion 
describe default states that do not occur. To explain why observed populations deviate 
from the expected default conditions, one has to identify relevant mechanisms. Moreover, 
some ecologists explicitly claim that identification of regularities, such as allometries, is 
the first step toward revealing the underlying mechanisms. Explaining how the lower-
level mechanisms are responsible for upper-level regularities is the goal of ecology 
(Brown, Gillooly, Allen, Savage, & West, 2004). 
 
5.3 The new paradigm of insular biogeography and the old norms of explanation 
 
 TIB has not been able to account for all the patterns of insular biogeography. The 
accumulated problems have prompted projects to change the equilibrium paradigm. The 
new proposals call for amending the equilibrium principle of the theory to accommodate 
processes that are not at equilibrium or are nonequilibrium, as well as for 
acknowledgment of the importance of diverse features of species, islands and landscapes 
or seascapes in influencing immigration and extinction, and of in situ speciation and 
species interactions (Lomolino, 2000; Lomolino & Brown, 2009). Yet the new paradigm 
of island biogeography appears to require the mechanistic approach. Lomolino and 
Brown suggest that the new theory of island biogeography should be multi-scale, species- 
and process-based, and include system feedback (2009, p. 385). In terms of the 
mechanistic approach, for the theory to be multi-scale, it means that it should draw on 
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information from multiple levels of mechanism, and which are not merely levels of size, 
or composition. The components cited in explanations could be of different sizes, and 
situated at different levels of the conventional hierarchy of levels of organization from 
cells to the biosphere. What components and from which levels should be cited depends 
on the problem being investigated. That the theory must be species- and process-based 
means that it must take into consideration the properties of species and islands that affect 
the basal processes of immigration, extinction, and evolution (Lomolino & Brown, 2009, 
p. 385). Such a focus on properties of components and examining how changes in the 
properties affect the behavior that the components produce is a core requirement of 
mechanistic explanation and it derives from the definition of mechanisms. System 
feedback can take the form of interspecific interaction, evolutionary divergence and 
speciation, all of which can affect the basal processes and the capacities of species 
(Lomolino & Brown, 2009, p. 385). On the mechanistic view, no examination of 
components would be complete without considering how they interact, what they do, or 
what happens to them. The requirement to take into account how interspecific interaction, 
divergence of populations over time and speciation influence insular biotas fits the 
mechanistic normative account. Thus, the new paradigm of island biogeography appears 
to be committed to the old mechanistic approach to explanation.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 The foregoing examination has shown that TIB is a book that was instrumental in 
initiating a paradigm in ecology. Based on other works of MacArthur and Wilson, I 
argued that they assumed a mechanistic philosophy of science. In light of that, and given 
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two more recent accounts of mechanistic explanation, I showed in detail that TIB 
implements a mechanistic approach to explanation. Since TIB is a paradigmatic work of 
ecology, I used the analysis of its mechanistic approach to formulate a normative account 
of mechanistic explanation in ecology. Furthermore, I showed that a mechanistic 
perspective solves a dispute on the nature of ecology and that the new paradigm of 
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